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Disagreement and Religion:
Problems and Prospects*
Matthew A. Benton
Disagreements over religion are common, entrenched, and often bit-ter. Harmful sectarian and internecine conflict, when taken to ex-tremes, often result in war and terrorism. Even when less violent,
such pervasive disagreements can nevertheless aict social groups and family
relationships. Understanding the social and political contexts of such events
is a task for historians and sociologists. Evaluating the religious divisions
themselves is a task for theologians and scholars of religion.
Philosophers, on the other hand, focus largely on conceptual and norma-
tive issues emerging from what sorts of disagreements there are, and what
dierences they might make to what an individual should, or should not, be-
lieve. Such disagreements over religion oer a lens on how to think about
distinctive epistemological issues, such as the nature and weight of evidence
when it comes to religious topics; the rationality of belief or religious prac-
tices; the epistemological import of understanding; the value of epistemic
humility given an awareness of religious diversity; whether testimony is an
adequate basis for believing anything related to religion; and whether knowl-
edge in some religious domain is possible given widespread disagreement.
Religious devotion, of course, consists in more than simply cognitive com-
mitments of the sort labelled by doxastic concepts like belief, faith, or credence
(subjective probability, as studied by formal epistemology). But epistemol-
ogists in philosophy have attended largely to the doxastic terrain because
cognitive commitments are thought in some sense to ground the rationality
of deciding to engage, or continue in, the practices associated with a religion
(or in the case of nonbelief, refraining from such commitments grounds the
rationality of abstaining from practicing any particular religion at all). So we
*To appear in Religious Disagreement and Pluralism, M. Benton and J. Kvanvig, eds.,
Oxford University Press.
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shall focus largely on the broad family of doxastic notions often captured by
the label of “belief,” where this most often refers to outright belief of the sort
which, if true and other conditions hold, could count as knowledge; but we
shall sometimes also consider credence, understanding, and where relevant,
faith.1
This chapter aims to provide a map of the contemporary landscape on dis-
agreement, detailing both the conceptual and normative issues in play in the
debates in mainstream analytic epistemology, and how these have (and have
not) translated into the domain of religious diversity and disagreement.2 In §1
we examine several sorts of disagreement, and consider in detail some episte-
mological issues on which many philosophers have recently focused: in partic-
ular, what range of attitudes a body of evidence can support, understanding
higher-order evidence, and thinking about who counts as an epistemic “peer”.
In §2 we will turn to how some of these questions surface when considering
disagreements over religion, including debates over the nature of evidence
and truth in religion, epistemic humility, concerns about irrelevant influences
and about divine hiddenness, and arguments over exclusivism, inclusivism,
and pluralism.3 Finally, §3 oers a brief summary of the contributors’ essays
in this volume.
1 Epistemology and Disagreement
Philosophers thinking about the epistemology of disagreement4 have tended
to approach the matter by asking when, if ever, learning about a specific sort
1A large literature has recently emerged examining the nature of faith, including whether
it must involve a cognitive propositional commitment. See, e.g., Audi 2011, Buchak 2012 and
2014a, Howard-Snyder 2016, and Kvanvig 2018, and Rice, McKaughn, and Howard-Snyder
2017 (including the several essays in that issue). For a helpful overview, see Buchak 2014b.
Related issues are raised by the philosophy literature on trust: see e.g. Faulkner and Simpson
2017 for a selection.
2Related issues arise with the domain of moral disagreement; though we cannot consider
them here, see Mackie 1977 (chap. 1), Audi 2014, Vavova 2014, and Rowland 2017.
3Some parts of these sections borrow from, or expands on, material in Benton 2019.
4See especially the collections Feldman and Warfield 2010; Christensen and Lackey 2013;
and Machuca 2013. For overviews, see Christensen 2009, Frances and Matheson 2018, and
Ferrari and Pedersen 2019.
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of disagreement with one’s belief ought to lead one to revise that belief (for
example, by dropping the belief and suspending judgment on the matter; or,
if one began with merely a high credence as opposed to an outright belief,
by lowering one’s credence). For it seems that in a great range of cases,
encountering such a disagreement puts pressure on you to at least become
less confident that you, as opposed to your disagreer, are getting things right.
That is, it can seem that the only rational option for you is to concede that you
may be getting it wrong, and modulate your conviction so as to be conciliatory
toward one’s interlocutor. For example, imagine that you and a friend go out
to dinner. You both agree to split the check evenly, adding a 20% tip. You
both look at the bill, and each mentally calculate your share. You confidently
conclude that each owes $43, whereas your friend concludes that each of you
owe $48. How should you respond?5
If you supposed yourself to be typically better at such mental calculations,
you might insist that your friend recalculate while you maintain confidence
in your result. (Or vice versa if you think your friend is likely to be better at
such calculations.) But suppose that, prior to this dinner check disagreement,
you regarded your friend as being about as good as you at mental math, and
suppose that you regarded your memory and cognitive functioning (and how
much you’ve had to drink) as being about equal. If you had regarded them
in these ways as your peer with respect to mental calculation on this occasion,
it would be in part because you had no reasons independent of the current
disagreement over how much each owes to think that you rather than they
would conclude correctly. But if so, it can seem highly irrational for you now
to prioritize your answer as correct and insist that they must have made a
mistake; for from your perspective, you were each as likely as the other to have
made a mistake. So if you’re rational, you will probably lower your confidence
that you each owe $43, and rethink your calculations, since either (or both)
of you may have made a mistake.6 This seems all the more appropriate when
one imagines how you would feel if you came to learn instead that your dinner
5See Christensen 2007, 193 and 2009, 757 for such cases.
6Similar cases can be given about perceptual judgments rather than mental reasoning
(Feldman 2006, 223; 2007, 207–208), for example, that you and your friend each see the
end of a horse race, from nearly identical viewing points, but you disagree about which horse
won (Kelly 2010, 113).
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friend had agreed with your conclusion: you would no doubt become, if only
slightly, more confident that you had gotten it right.
More generally, when we regard our interlocutors as being our peers—as
well-informed as we, and of similar intelligence (and not joking with us)—
then learning that they disagree, particularly when we are working with the
same evidence, ought to lead us each to suspend judgment and reassess.
Similar results apply when we move from full belief, disbelief, and suspension
of belief, to finer-grained doxastic states like degrees of belief or subjective
probabilities, sometimes called credences:7 if you have a 0.9 credence that it
will rain in Seattle today, whereas I have only 0.3 credence that it will rain in
Seattle today, and we both updated only on evidence from (what we regard as)
equally reliable sources about the weather, you will likely lower your credence
from 0.9 (and I will likely raise mine from 0.3).8 And this seems like the most
rational thing for each of us to do.
Both of the above cases are framed from the first-person perspective, imag-
ining yourself as one of the participants: from that perspective, it seems that
you each should reduce your confidence (or drop your belief altogether) and
reconsider. But return to the dinner check-splitting case, and take a neutral
third-person perspective: someone else observing us might arrive at a dier-
ent judgment about what we each should do. They might insist that if the
correct answer was that we each owe $48, then strictly speaking, only you,
and not your friend, should reduce your confidence and recalculate, since
your friend in fact got it right. Perhaps then there is a sense in which the
person, if any, who was accurate in their assessment has the right to remain
steadfast in their belief. But recall that from the accurate party’s perspective,
their disagreer was as likely as they themselves were to have made a mistake;
7Credences are thought of as a measure of “partial” belief. Credences in a proposition p
are given by real numbers from 0 (complete certainty in p’s falsity) to 1 (complete certainty
in p’s truth), where 0.5 amounts to being indierent, p being as likely as not. Axioms of
the probability calculus provide constraints on such credences; formal epistemologists argue
over principles of probabilistic reasoning, particularly how to model appropriate updates
to one’s credences, given new evidence. For overviews, see Weisberg 2019, and Hájek and
Stael forthcoming.
8Hereafter, unless otherwise stated, I shall use “belief” as a catch-all to refer to both full
and partial belief, such that “lowering” one’s confidence can mean either dropping one’s full
belief in favor or suspending judgment, or reducing one’s credence.
4
for a crucial feature of the case is that they have no independent reason, out-
side their handling of the evidence, to think that they are indeed accurate
rather than inaccurate on this occasion. It would seem dubiously obstinate
for them to insist that, even though they regard you as a mental math peer,
you and not them should recalculate because, in fact, you each owe $48; for
the disagreement itself, given that you are peers, seems to call into question
whether you each owe that amount. Perhaps then rationality requires that
in cases of disagreement between those we regard as peers, we ought to be
conciliatory by shifting our confidence away from our initial conclusion, and
toward our peer’s. The normative principles according to which we ought to
do this vary among those who endorse such Conciliationism. For example,
according to an early view, one must grant “equal weight” to one’s peer’s
opinion as one would to one’s own, and doing so requires that each reduce
one’s confidence, perhaps even suspend judgment or move to 0.5 credence,
when one first learns of such disagreements.9 Such a view might recommend
that in such cases, one must “split the dierence” between a peer’s credence
and one’s own.
1.1 Uniqueness and Permissivism
Many philosophers claim that implicit in such Conciliationist views is the idea
that a given set of evidence supports, at most, only one doxastic response,
such as belief, or a particular credence.10 Consider the principle Uniqueness:
Uniqueness Given one’s total evidence there is, at most, one unique
rational doxastic attitude that one can take to any proposition.11
If Uniqueness (or something comparable) is true, then when two peers han-
dle the same evidence and end up disagreeing on the conclusion, at least one
of them has mistakenly arrived at an irrational doxastic attitude. The one
9See Elga 2007, Christensen 2007, King 2012, Cohen 2013, and Matheson 2014 and 2015
for discussion.
10However, Christensen 2016 argues that Conciliationism can be motivated even without
Uniqueness.
11White 2005, 445, and Feldman 2007, 205. For a detailed overview of ensuing debate,
see Kopec and Titelbaum 2016.
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who has formed the irrational attitude should revise their view; but on the
assumption that each peer has no independent reason to think themselves
the irrational one, each will, given Uniqueness, likely feel conciliatory pres-
sure in the above cases. Thus some philosophers argue that Uniqueness helps
explain such conciliatory pressure. But if Uniqueness is false, there is room
for thinking that there could sometimes be reasonable disagreements, even
among peers who have the same evidence. Denying Uniqueness amounts to
endorsing a permissive view of what rationality requires, such that one’s evi-
dence may rationally support more than one doxastic position. But there are
dierent ways of departing from Uniqueness. One might be what Roger White
(2005) calls a radical permissivist, by thinking that, at least in some circum-
stances, one’s total evidence can permit either believing that p or believing
that ¬p. But arguably, if rationality could be that permissive (even if only
in perhaps rare circumstances), then people with identical evidence could
sometimes reasonably disagree, since that evidence can reasonably support
believing either way. Yet in those cases at least, believing a particular way can
seem arbitrary and not directed at the truth. Such a radical permissiveness
would also, paradoxically, suggest that each of the disagreers could rightly
think that the other reasonably evaluated the evidence, even though each will
presumably still regard their own assessment of the evidence as reasonable
and correct.12 Less controversially, one might be a moderate permissivist by
denying this radical view yet insisting that, at least in some circumstances,
one’s total evidence can permit, say, either believing that p or suspending
judgment on p. More moderate still would be a view that denies each of the
above concerning outright belief and withholding belief, but allows that in
some circumstances, one’s evidence at least makes rational a (perhaps small)
range of credences (e.g. Schoenfield 2014 and 2018).13 Each of these per-
missivist approaches oers a kind of pluralism about the sorts of doxastic
response that a set of evidence supports.
12See Schoenfield 2014, 200–202 for discussion of similar worries.
13Note that in the empirical sciences, it is standard practice to oer confidence intervals
along with predictions, where the disciplinary methodologies have some guidelines for how
to produce such intervals, given the data and the hypotheses under examination. One way to
think about such confidence intervals is to allow that the data (evidence) in question permit
a range of credences in the prediction.
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Notice however that for any such permissivist view, it is desirable that
the view be able to oer an account of under what circumstances, or with
respect to which domains, we can expect the permissivism to hold, and why.
When exactly might a set of evidence in and of itself permit more than one
doxastic response, or a range of credences? What domains, if not idealized
cases of peers doing mental math for splitting a dinner check, may allow
for reasonable disagreement over one’s conclusion? In addition, permissivist
approaches need to explain how, if rationality is permissive (when it is), it
remains a guide to the truth: for if rationality permits a range of doxastic
responses on some matter, some rational believers will be less accurate than
others14 (e.g. Horowitz 2019).
1.2 Higher-Order Evidence
Perhaps any conciliatory pressure when learning of a peer’s diering response
may be explained by the suggestion that learning, for the first time, of a
peer disagreement provides you with new evidence, higher-order evidence.
Evidence which bears directly on the truth of a proposition p may be called
first-order evidence, whereas higher-order evidence is indirect in its bearing
on p: it may reveal something about the character of the first-order evidence,
or about how well you evaluated the first-order evidence. So according to
this line of thought, in cases of disagreement, although the initial (first-order)
evidence on which you arrived at your conclusion seems to you to support, say,
p, learning that your peer with comparable evidence concluded instead that
p is false (¬p) can give you higher-order evidence that you wrongly evaluated
the initial, first-order evidence.15
For example, Richard Feldman insisted that learning of a peer’s reaching a
dierent conclusion, on the basis of the same evidence, amounts to evidence
against one’s own conclusion because “evidence that there is evidence for
14Or, on a credence-accuracy framework, some subjects’ credences will be scored as fur-
ther from the truth, which will presumably (eventually) yield undesirable practical results
owing to their credences being less than fully accurate. For a substantial study, see Pettigrew
2018.
15For helpful discussion of the relation between first-order and higher-order evidence, see
Kvanvig 2014, Chaps. 4 and 5.
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p is evidence for p” (Feldman 2006, 223; 2007, 208).16 Such a principle
makes sense of the idea that learning about peers disagreeing gives me a new
sort of evidence for their conclusion. For it says that discovering that a peer
concludes dierently on the basis of the same evidence E provides me with
new higher-order evidence that I have misconstrued what E supports. More
specifically, Feldman recently argues for:
EEE3 If S has evidence, E1, supporting the proposition that there
is someone who has evidence that supports p, then S has some
evidence, E2, that supports p. (2014, 292)
EEE3 could explain why we ought to reduce our confidence in such situations.
For if learning about the relevant disagreement provides me with additional
evidence against what I had concluded, then respecting this new evidence
plausibly requires that I adjust my confidence downward in light of it.
However, EEE3, as a universal principle, cannot be correct. Suppose that
your friend Joe is to guess which one of three objects you are about to put
into an empty box: an apple, a ball, or some cheese. Out of his sight, you put
in the apple; so you know that there is an apple in the box, but he does not.
You then tell Joe that it isn’t a ball in the box. Given what Joe knows about
the setup, your testimony provides Joe with some evidence there is cheese
in the box, because Joe’s learning that it’s not a ball raises the probability
for Joe that it’s cheese in the box. This is because when Joe learns that of
the three possibilities, it isn’t a ball, the probability for him that it is cheese
in the box goes up (as does the probability for him that it is an apple). As
the antecedent of EEE3 has it, you have evidence (E1) that there is someone
(namely Joe) who has evidence which supports (p) that there is cheese in the
box. But E1 does not raise the probability for you that there is cheese in the
box, because you know there is no cheese in the box. So your knowing E1
is not, for you, evidence (E2) which supports the hypothesis (p) that there is
cheese inside. (If it were, then by merely telling Joe that what you put in the
box is not a ball, you would thereby have acquired some startling evidence
16But see Fitelson 2012 for a swift refutation of this slogan, which also casts doubt on
Feldman’s EEE3, considered below.
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that you didn’t put in an apple. But that’s absurd.) So EEE3 is false.17
So precise principles about evidence such as Uniqueness, or about the re-
lation of higher-order to first-order evidence, can seem problematic. Another
way to think about why disagreements often induce us, when they do, to lower
our confidence is that they raise the possibility that the route by which we
arrived at our belief may not be reliably related to that belief’s being true.
Looked at in this way, disagreements bear a similarity to certain debunking
arguments which explicitly oer a genealogical account of the causal origins
of one’s beliefs whose causal paths do not include the truth of what is be-
lieved; so if one nevertheless believes a truth, such debunking arguments
suggest, it is largely a matter of luck.18 But disagreements raise such doubt
implicitly, without oering any genealogy, since they merely reveal that one
of the disagreeing parties must be arriving at their beliefs by a less than ideal
route. Once such a doubt is raised, many think that one can typically address
the doubt only by having (or finding) some independent grounds for think-
ing that one’s belief forming methods are indeed the sort that would reliably
17 Note that Feldman’s replies to anticipated objections to EEE3 (2014, 296–299) don’t
apply to this case. For example, it won’t do to say that EEE3 stands because you have some
evidence E2 which, for Joe, supports p; for EEE3 is supposed to be about how S’s having
evidence of someone else’s evidence provides evidential support for S. Sometimes Feldman
replies to objections by noting that S still has evidence, even though it is defeated (such that
it is indeed evidence for someone else, who doesn’t have the defeater). But in our above case,
what proposition would serve as the defeater for you? For the relevant propositions are: (E1)
that there is someone, Joe, who has evidence that there is cheese in the box, (E2) that you
told him that there is not a ball in the box, (p) that there is cheese in the box, and (r), known
only to you, that there is (only) an apple in the box. But given what is salient in this case,
knowing r amounts to knowing the conjunction of (q) there is an apple in the box and (¬p)
there is not cheese in the box. So if one wants to claim that you indeed have evidence for
p, that there is cheese in the box, but which is nevertheless defeated, it is defeated by your
knowledge that ¬p, that there is not cheese in the box. But this is highly unorthodox: for
most epistemologists, having rebutting evidence defeats one’s knowledge, rather than one’s
knowledge “defeating” a rebutting defeater. (Note, if one takes this unorthodox road, the
more general question looms: what distinguishes cases of knowledge in the presence of such
defeaters, from cases where the defeater robs one of knowledge?) It seems better then to
abandon such talk and just admit that in this case you really don’t “have” evidence for p;
and this is because you know that p is false. (For a related case where knowledge precludes
defeat, see Benton 2016, §4; cf. also Kelly 2013, 45. For helpful discussion on providing and
having evidence, see Anderson 2018.)
18For recent debate in epistemology over how problematic debunking considerations are,
see White 2010, Vavova 2018, and Srinivasan 2015 and 2019.
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lead to true beliefs. Moreover, large scale disagreements such as those found
among religious groups, along with the demographic distributions of them,
can suggest how susceptible many people are to the ways that beliefs pattern
among social groups (more on this in section §2.2).
A common way of construing how disagreement accomplishes its epis-
temic work is to appeal explicitly to the notion of an epistemic defeater, which
is supposed to defeat the justification one might need in order to know, or
even acceptably believe, one’s views. Perhaps some disagreements provide
one with a defeater even if not by providing one with counterevidence or even
with higher-order evidence concerning p itself; and such defeaters, it would
seem, can make it rationally mandatory to revise one’s belief. Perhaps then in
the dinner case, learning that your peer reached a dierent conclusion defeats
whatever it was from your own calculating which justified believing your own
conclusion (and realizing the force of this defeater, you rightly reconsider).
Thinking about larger scale disagreements, Sanford Goldberg (2013b, 2014,
2015) argues that when the peer disagreements are known to be systematic,
this presents one with a defeater for the justification one might have for one’s
belief. Systematic disagreements are (i) widespread, (ii) entrenched, and (iii)
non-localized, that is, they involve many related matters rather than the dis-
pute being only over a particular local proposition. Such defeaters are not
easily dispensed with (for example, by defeating them with some other evi-
dence which would defeat the defeater), because these disagreements induce
the concern that even those who believe truly are, again, somehow lucky to
arrive at the truth. Given this, systematic disagreements can seem to rob
one’s beliefs of justification.19 Whether this is plausible, however, will depend
on an array of details: do such disagreements still defeat when someone care-
fully arrives at one’s view while fully understanding the systematic nature of
the disagreements in question (such as in philosophy, or in religion)? Does
defeat only occur when the disagreements lead a subject to take seriously
the prospect that they’ve misevaluated the evidence, or does the fact of such
disagreements make it the case that one ought to take this seriously, whether
19Though widely used in epistemology, the viability of knowledge defeat in epistemol-
ogy has come under challenge: see Lasonen-Aarnio 2010 and 2014, Greco 2010, chap. 10,
Hawthorne and Srinivasan 2013, and Baker-Hytch and Benton 2015. See also fn. 17.
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or not one does so?20 What if, in particular, one’s view predicts or explains
why there would be systematic disagreements of the sort in question? Would
that be enough to render the defeater inert?
The main idea considered thus far is that learning of disagreements, par-
ticularly when they are with peers who seem to have the same or comparable
evidence, generates pressure to revise or weaken our opinion; and Concilia-
tionists argue that this pressure reflects something important about epistemic
rationality. Yet it is dicult to formulate well-motivated principles which ex-
press the normative idea underlying why we ought to revise when it seems
that we should. Moroever, some have criticized Conciliationism on a number
of grounds which are worth exploring.
1.3 When I Think about You, I Trust Myself
Insofar as some Conciliationists have aimed to oer a universal principle of
rationality which would cover all the relevant cases, a common objection is
that Conciliationism is self-undermining: if it is true, then we should not
be very confident of it, for when applied to itself, it says we should lower
our confidence in it. This is because many philosophers, who presumably
regard each other as peers and consider all the same arguments, disagree
over the truth of Conciliationism. At the very least, by the (unrestricted)
Conciliationist’s lights, such a Conciliationist should not be very confident of
their own view.21 Even worse, a philosopher inclined toward Conciliationism
thus has reasons from peer disagreement to become not very confident in any
of their philosophical views, given the presence of capable philosophers who
disagree with them (see Goldberg 2013a). Similar thoughts apply to equal
weight views of Conciliationism: to accept such an equal weight view, given
philosophers who disagree, one has to “inconsistently both be very confident
that it is true and not very confident that it is true” (Weatherson 2013, 55).
Thomas Kelly (2005, 2010, 2011) raises several concerns for versions of
Conciliationism, even for idealized cases. One worry is that deferring to one’s
peer by reducing one’s confidence can look like an illicit double-counting of
20This would be a special kind, a normative defeater. See Lackey 2008, 45 and 198.;
Goldberg 2016 and 2017; and Benton 2016 for concerns.
21See Elga 2010; cf. Pittard 2015b and 2020 for a way out.
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the evidence. Suppose we each begin with the same evidence set E bearing
on whether p, and after evaluating E, we share our findings: I conclude that
p whereas you conclude that ¬p. If I treat your contrary belief, reached from
your evaluation of E, as an added reason to believe ¬p, then I’ve allowed E to
have additional evidential weight (processed through you) beyond the weight
I’ve already given it. And somewhat awkwardly, in doing this, I would be
treating the fact that you believe ¬p on the basis of E, as a reason for me to
believe ¬p, even though you wouldn’t yourself regard your believing that ¬p
as an additional reason—on top of E—for believing ¬p (Kelly 2005, 187.).
But it would be illicit for you to use the fact that you believe ¬p on the basis
of E as further reason, on top of E, to believe ¬p: it would seem like a sort of
bootstrapping22 to use your own belief in this way to increase your confidence
in what you believe.23 Yet if it would be problematic for you to use your belief
that ¬p in this way, why should it be okay for me to use your belief to increase
my confidence in ¬p?
Another worry, at least for Equal Weight versions of Conciliationism
which assume Uniqueness, is that doing what they advise can lead one away
from the rational attitude required by Uniqueness. Suppose there is a fact
about the degree to which evidence E supports p, namely, that it makes p 0.8
probable, and that we each only have E bearing on p. Upon evaluating E,
suppose that your credence in p is, quite rightly, 0.8, whereas I botch it, quite
unreasonably arriving at a credence of 0.2. In such a case you got it exactly
right, fulfilling the uniquely rational doxastic attitude given E. But when we
discuss E and our conflicting credences over p, the Equal Weight view requires
that you must, to be rational, split the dierence with me and we must both
then be 0.5 confident in p. But to do this would be for you to depart from
22See Weisberg 2012.
23Indeed, this consideration is part of why Conciliationists oppose a view on which one
can remain steadfast in one’s belief in the face of such a disagreement: for it would beg the
question against one’s disagreeing peer to reason, “Well, you believe that ¬p, but E supports
p (as I believe), so clearly, your belief is mistaken.” However, Lasonen-Aarnio 2015 argues
against the idea that learning of others’ opinions may function as higher-order evidence for
one, whereas learning of one’s own cannot: “it is at best implausible and at worst incoherent
to allow evidence about the (present) doxastic states of others to have a certain kind of
epistemic import, but not to allow evidence about one’s own (present) states to have that
kind of import” (269–270).
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the uniquely rational attitude toward p given E. Thus the Equal Weight view
results in making the original E irrelevant to the bearing of our new evidence
(which includes E but also includes the facts about what credences we had
reached upon consulting E) on p; the actual evidence E bearing on p gets
completely swamped by psychological facts about what the two of us believe
(Kelly 2010, 123–124). What is more, the Equal Weight view arguably cannot
be spelled out in plausible way in a Bayesian framework while also capturing
all the intuitions of the cases marshalled in its support, unless it disrespects
some of the very principles which motivated it (Lasonen-Aarnio 2013).24
Concerns like these have led some philosophers to argue that often
enough, when encountering some peer disagreements, one can nevertheless
rationally remain steadfast in one’s belief. Such views insist that the facts
about who reasoned correctly, or best evaluated the evidence, or gets (closest
to) the truth, play a role in who may rationally maintain their belief, for what
is rational here is not simply a matter of judging who is most likely to be in
epistemic error from the internal, first-person perspective.25 On Kelly’s “total
evidence” view, for example, parties to such disagreements must take into
account both the first-order evidence on which they each initially arrived at
their conclusions, as well as the higher-order evidence gained from learning
about the disagreement. But in some cases it may be that the first-order evi-
dence is strong enough to allow one party, who assessed it correctly in fact,
to maintain their belief, even if they lose a bit of confidence. On this view,
whether it is reasonable for one party to remain steadfastly in their belief is
not separable from whether they are getting it most right (Kelly 2013, 35).26
Even more strongly, Hawthorne and Srinivasan (2013) argue for a knowl-
24Lasonen-Aarnio argues that it is subject to a trilemma: it violates intuitively correct
updates (conditionalization), it imposes implausible restrictions on prior credence functions,
or it is non-substantive. What is worse, she argues that any blanket view of disagreement is
subject to a similar worry.
25See van Inwagen 2010, Hawthorne and Srinivasan 2013, Kelly 2010 and 2013, Weather-
son 2013, and Titelbaum 2015 (esp. 282.).
26There are, of course, lots of cases where one quite reasonably is unmoved by a disagree-
ment, such as when confronting a conspiracy theorist (see Kelly 2013, 40–46, discussing a
Holocaust denier; or compare someone who denies climate change; etc.). But in such cases,
it is far more plausible to judge that they have not considered all of the evidence, or have
unreasonably discounted much of it. So these tend to be uninteresting cases of non-peer
disagreement.
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edge disagreement norm, on which “one should be ‘conciliatory’ in the face of
disagreement—that is, give up one’s belief that p and trust one’s disagreeing
interlocutor that not-p—just in case so trusting would lead one to know that
not-p,” whereas “one should be ‘dogmatic’ in the face of disagreement—that
is, dismiss one’s interlocutor and continue to believe p—if one knows that p”
(2013, 12). Such a view supposes that even in many disclosed disagreements,
one of the parties can, in some cases at least, count as knowing their conclu-
sion, despite the standard assumption made by most philosophers above, that
such disagreements change each party’s evidence, or at least defeat one’s jus-
tification or knowledge.27 Even if one takes on their (controversial) view that
one party’s knowledge might survive in a context of disagreement, Hawthorne
and Srinivansan also accept that knowing is not always transparent to the
knower,28 and thus their proposed knowledge diagreement norm is not, as
they acknowledge, perfectly operationalizable (2013, 15.). This aspect of
their view will dissatisfy those who expect from a norm of what one ought to
do that one be well-positioned to discern, and to carry out, what the norm
requires in a given situation.29
Some may worry that any non-Conciliationist view will sanction a prob-
lematic stance of dogmatism in the face of disagreement, and that such a
stance contributes to the phenomenon of belief polarization.30 When people
with incompatible views are presented with mixed evidence bearing on those
views, people tend to interpret the evidence in such a way that minimizes the
evidence against their own view while allowing the evidence for their view to
27Hawthorne and Srinivasan (2013, 21–25) are unimpressed by the extant work arguing
for easy knowledge defeat. Cf. also fn. 19.
28Using Williamson’s terminology (2000, chap. 4): where a condition C is luminous just
in case whenever one is in C, one is in a position to know one is in C, whereas C is absence-
luminous just in case whenever one is not in C, one is in a position to know that one is not
in C; and a condition is transparent just in case it is both luminous and absence-luminous.
Williamson (chap. 4) argues against the luminosity of knowledge, and of mental states more
generally.
29Astute readers will notice that the debate between Conciliationists and (some forms of)
Steadfasters mimics the broader rivalry between internalists and externalists in epistemology.
Looked at another way, the former seems to prioritize avoiding error, whereas the latter
prioritizes believing the truth (in terms of William James’ twin epistemic goals: James 1912,
17). I leave it to readers to draw out any significant ramifications of such parallels.
30See Lord, Ross, and Lepper 1979, and Kelly 2008.
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increase their confidence in it (and it may be that certain sorts of cherished
domains, such as politics, morality, or religion, lend themselves more easily
to the evidence looking rather mixed). Such responses exacerbate the extent
of the disagreement, as each side hardens in their commitments. Approaches
to peer disagreement which permit Steadfast responses might be objected to
on the grounds that they seem to give cover to each side of a disagreement:
inasmuch as each party treats their own side with partiality in their handling
of the evidence, or avoids proper engagement with the contrary evidence
when it is encountered, they are to that extent fostering belief polarization
by irrational means. Arguably, however, what best explains the occurrence of
belief polarization is not some normative view (such as Steadfastness), nor
(in some cases) confirmation bias, but rather the fact that people tend to
devote more cognitive eort to scrutinizing heavily the evidence which does
not comport well with their own view, so as to explain it in other ways (Kelly
2008).31 Doing so means that one assesses the counterevidence against a
broader background of alternative hypotheses, and thus it has a smaller ev-
idential eect for the party which disagrees; whereas each party will tend
to spend less time and eort scrutinizing the evidence which supports their
view (Kelly 2008). It is possible for such attentive scrutiny to be the result of
epistemic humility in one’s own view, if such dierential treatment manifests
a respect for opposing positions. And a habit of closer scrutiny of the coun-
terevidence is obviously compatible with the spirit of Conciliationism, should
one allow that counterevidence to reduce one’s confidence in one’s view (even
if such reduction is muted in part by the mixed nature of the evidence).
We have so far explored in some detail the concepts at play in recent
work on the epistemology of disagreement, including grounds for oering, or
questioning, normative principles which have been proposed about what one
should do when learning about dierent sorts of disagreement. Let us now
turn to disagreement over religion.
31For those who want to conclude that such a practice is unreasonable, Kelly notes that
the empirical sciences proceed in just this way (2008, 624).
15
2 Disagreement over Religion
Many of the central questions raised above were originally posed by philoso-
phers who had their eye on the significance of religious disagreement (espe-
cially Gutting 1982; Alston 1988, Hick 1988, 1989, and 1997, van Inwagen
1994, 41–46, and 1996, 139; Plantinga 1995; Rosen 2001, 83–87).32
Religion is a controversial domain: religions distinguish themselves by
making various claims about the supernatural, humanity, and how to live.
Even among religious adherents who share certain core religious commit-
ments, there remains much disagreement between sects or denominations,
and even within narrow denominations, over doctrine, worship, spirituality,
the afterlife, religious or spiritual leadership, and so on. Insofar as it is pos-
sible to demarcate major religions in terms of their core traditions, texts,
and doctrinal agreements, we may call disagreements between those within
a religion as intra-religious disagreement. More central to our purposes are
disagreements between major religions, such as disagreements over the na-
ture of the divine or the supernatural, what sacred texts are divinely inspired
or otherwise canonical, how God or the supernatural has manifested itself
in historical events, who counts as a prophet or divine messenger, how to
practice spirituality, and so on. Such dierences distinguish, say, Islam from
Christianity, each of these from Buddhism or Hinduism, and so on. This is
inter-religious disagreement. But of course, contributing to the overall diver-
sity concerning religion are the many non-religious or irreligious, particularly
atheists, who think that nearly all positive claims (at least about the existence
of the supernatural) are false. This we may call extra-religious disagreement.
For simplicity’s sake, we shall begin by focusing on the basic positions of the
theist, atheist, and agnostic (one who has not yet decided what to believe).33
32For overviews of the issues applied to religious disagreement, see King 2008, Basinger
2015, Pittard 2015a, King and Kelly 2017, and Benton 2019. For in-depth discussions, see
the collections Kraft and Basinger 2016, and Meister 2011, as well as the monographs Kraft
2012, Axtell 2018, De Cruz 2019, and especially Pittard 2020, which is state of the art.
33By ‘theist’ I mean to be as broad as possible: someone who thinks that an extremely
powerful, extremely knowledgeable, and extremely benevolent being exists. By ‘atheist’ I
mean one who thinks ultimate reality is at bottom just the physical, natural world, and there
are no spiritual truths or practices worthy of our attention. Given these labels, a non-theistic
Hindu or Buddhist, for example, would be religious but not count as an atheist (nor a theist).
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Later we will consider how questions about disagreement surface related to
inter-religious disagreement.
One swift application of the ideas from the last section is to suggest that
the fact of extra-religious disagreement puts conciliatory pressure on any the-
ist (or other religious view such as non-theist Hinduism), and on any nat-
uralistic atheist, to reduce their confidence in their view. Even if we allow
that there will be varying sorts of experiences and evidence, and that not
everyone will count as one’s “peer,” the sheer numbers of those who disagree
with one’s own stance on religion ought to give one pause that one is getting
it right.34 Looked at this way, widespread extra-religious disagreement looks
like it supports the agnostic who insists we should suspend judgment on what
stance on religion is correct, and continue to examine all such worldviews.35
But when considering whether such agnosticism is justified, one weighing up
atheism versus a broadly religious worldview (theistic or otherwise) might
insist that it also matters that the broadly religious outlook manifests large
scale agreements, against the atheist, about the nature of ultimate reality and
the life most worth living. Indeed, one might argue that this feature of extra-
religious disagreement blunts any apparent pressure to be agnostic, and could
even provide some weight in favor of a broadly religious worldvie36 (we shall
consider this in more detail when we look at common consent arguments
later). Looked at this way, it is unclear that Conciliationist considerations
should automatically push one toward agnosticism. But if so, what of the
choice between atheism and a religious worldview? Presumably, one should
sincerely assess any available arguments and evidence.
However, complicating matters are concerns about what counts as evi-
dence in the religious domain; whether some forms of evidence are more
probative than others; and whether one must grant more weight to public
34However, see White 2018 for a challenge to the idea that if there is an epistemological
problem of the diversity of opinion, it only gets worse in a larger universe with more diversity.
35This is roughly the position Feldman (2006, 212–213) lands upon, which, he acknowl-
edges, is a challenge to his preference for atheism.
36Imagine we find that 9 people independently agree on p, but those 9 disgagree on more
specific claims q, r, s, ..., each of which entail p; whereas we find 1 person who thinks that ¬p,
and thus disagrees with the 9. We are unlikely to be moved by an argument to the eect
that, because those 9 disagree over the more specific claims q, r, s, ..., we should suspend
judgment on p.
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or shared evidence.37 In epistemology more generally, the main methods
of belief formation (or sources of evidence, if you like) are perception, tes-
timony, and reasoning (arguments). But reasoning from arguments is typ-
ically thought to be more trustworthy when they involve premises or expe-
riences which are universally available or involve shared common ground.
Thus philosophical arguments such as the cosmological or fine-tuning argu-
ments, or arguments from evil and suering, often present themselves as
publicly available and neutral reasoning about, say, whether there is a theis-
tic God. By contrast, those who appeal to religious experience (Alston 1991,
Swinburne 2004, Ch. 13) as a kind of perceptual evidence for God’s exis-
tence typically conceive of such evidence as inherently private. Even though
religious experience, as with sensory experience, seems to provide a sort of
direct evidence (as opposed to indirect grounds oered by reasoning or testi-
mony), some argue that with religious experience at least, its private nature
weakens any epistemic support it might give to the would-be believer.38
Testimony from trusted individuals can form another kind of ground for
belief (or disbelief), and social epistemologists have debated the conditions
under which we can acquire knowledge purely on the basis of another’s say-
so.39 Perhaps we can even consider the testimony of, or from within, an entire
tradition (cf. Zagzebski 2012; MacIntyre 1988). When it comes to testimony
about religion or the existence of the supernatural, there are questions about
whether testimonial grounds could justify religious belief; yet some have ar-
gued about that such testimony can appropriately ground religious beliefs
even in the midst of religious diversity (Baker-Hytch 2018). But the epistemic
force of such testimony may depend whether the testifier functions as an au-
thority or as a kind of expert advisor (see Lackey 2018). Moreover, most re-
flective individuals will weight the value of these distinct sources—arguments,
testimony, and religious experience, one’s own or others’—in very dierent
37For a broader introduction to issues of knowledge and skepticism in religious epistemol-
ogy, see Dunaway and Hawthorne 2017. For recent insights and new directions, see Benton,
Hawthorne, and Rabinowitz 2018.
38Where its inherent privacy results in its untestability; for this worry, see Martin 1952
and 1959; see Alston 1991, 209–211 for a reply. Cf. also James (1994 [1902], 460–462), who
argued that some mystical experiences could provide strong evidence to their subjects, but
not to anyone else.
39For a recent sampling, see Lackey and Sosa 2006; Lackey 2008; and Goldberg 2010.
18
ways. This confers on such sources the problem of how best to appraise these
kinds of evidence, particularly when there is such great variation in peoples’
exposure to, and their relative evaluations of, such evidence.
Finally, and relatedly, there is plausibly no dispute-independent standard
of the epistemic credentials by which one might be judged one’s epistemic
“peer”: for example, philosophically minded atheists may think that only
one’s capacity for intellectual reasoning matters, whereas certain religious
views may claim, say, that purity of heart or selfless love for others is a pre-
condition of learning the truth about God or the supernatural (see Pittard
2015a, §4). How would one decide which view, if either, is more correct?
Or, to take another example, what do we make of someone (perhaps a close
friend) who claims to have had a vivid and mystical religious experience, and
on this basis they convert to a religious life? Those who have not had such a
religious experience, yet are sympathetic to religion, might now regard this
friend as an epistemic expert of a kind, whose testimony should be given
strong weight. Whereas a religious skeptic will likely rule out such an experi-
ence, if really had, as easily explained on other psychological or naturalistic
grounds; given this, the skeptic may insist that such experiences should not
count as evidence for religious claims at all. Thus even if there were consen-
sus on what kind of evidence in the religious domain is most probative, there
is no dispute-neutral way of assessing which epistemic credentials one must
have in order to properly assess that evidence.40
2.1 What does Religious Disagreement Reveal?
So it appears that disagreement over religion, whether extra-religious or inter-
religious, is something of an intractable problem: whether investigating the
extra-religious dispute over whether to entertain a religious worldview at all,
or evaluating inter-religious disagreements in order to choose between reli-
gions, sincere inquirers should examine as much of the arguments and evi-
dence as they can. And yet deciding what counts as strong evidence, or de-
termining how to evaluate dierent (possibly conflicting) sources, are tasks
40This problem may extend to proposals on which what matters isn’t having the same
evidence, but rather that one should judge another a peer when they are (roughly) as justified,
given their evidence, in holding their religious beliefs: see Lackey 2014.
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fraught with diculty.
Some take the fact of such intractable disagreements to oer us a lesson
or two about religious reality. One natural approach sides with the sensi-
bilities of Conciliationism, and suggests that such disagreement (or learning
that it is widespread and entrenched) provides the religious believer with a
defeater of their justification, which at best downgrades how confident they
should be of their own religious view, and at worst, provides an argument for
religious skepticism.41 But if the former, such that one should be less confi-
dent, the result should be more humility and respectful tolerance for other
religions.42 Yet we shall consider three stronger applications of such ideas,
those found in debunking arguments, an argument from divine hiddenness,
and an argument for pluralism about religious truth.
2.2 Debunking and Irrelevant Inuences
Some argue that the demographic distributions of religious disagreement pro-
vide a debunking argument against religious belief, for it seems as though we
are strongly influenced to believe what those around us also believe. Thus,
the worry goes, what we end up believing seems highly contingent, depending
largely on the society and culture in which were raised. But such correlations
look like they hold whether or not the beliefs are true. Thus religious diver-
sity, in the patterns we find it, raises the concern that if one’s religious beliefs
are largely correct, this is somehow a matter of luck (recall our discussion
from §1.2).
This observation is not new. The medieval Muslim theologian al-Ghaza¯l¯ı
(ca. 1058–1111) acknowledged this concern:
As I drew near the age of adolescence the bonds of mere authority
(taql¯ıd) ceased to hold me and inherited beliefs lost their grip
upon me, for I saw that Christian youths always grew up to be
41See Feldman (2006, 212–213), cited above, as well as Bogardus (2013a), Bergmann
(2015 and 2017), and King (2016), who also assess how the argument to skepticism might be
resisted. Contrast Thurow (2012), who argues that extra-religious disagreement, given the
equal weight view, can provide evidence for theism, when deployed in a Bayesian framework.
42See especially Quinn 2006, Ch. 13 and 14, and Quinn 2002, 533–537 (excerpts reprinted
in Kraft and Basinger 2016).
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Christians, Jewish youths to be Jews, and Muslim youths to be
Muslims. (Watt 1994, 19)
Similarly Descartes (1596–1650), in Discourse on the Method, noted:
I thought, too, how the same man, with the same mind, if brought
up from infancy among the French or Germans, develops other-
wise than he would if he had always lived among the Chinese or
cannibals; and how, even in our fashions of dress, the very thing
that pleased us ten years ago, and will perhaps please us again ten
years hence, now strikes us as extravagant and ridiculous. Thus it
is custom and example that persuade us, rather than any certain
knowledge. (Cottingham et al., 1985, 119; AT 16)43
Note that these arguments depend upon the fact of religious diversity, and
the ways such traditions manifest themselves globally (though similar con-
cerns have been raised about other views, including views in philosophy44).
If we instead learned of a global environment where there was great religious
diversity but sociological facts about religious adherence did not reveal such
tight clustering with the culture in which one was raised, it would be much
harder to raise this debunking worry.
Why might we think of such socio-cultural forces as being irrelevant in-
fluences when it comes to religious commitment? After all, we find similar
such tight clustering in other domains: for it is also a sociological fact that
Parisians tend to know what the Eiel Tower is and exactly where it is located,
whereas those raised in Bangladesh may not even have such beliefs. So what
about religious beliefs and their diversity, exactly, makes them vulnerable to
the objection that there are irrelevant influences in play? Katia Vavova (2018,
136) argues that we should understand an irrelevant influence as follows:
43See also J.S. Mill (1975 [1859], Chap. 2): “And the world, to each individual, means the
part of it with which he comes in contact; his party, his sect, his church, his class of society...
Nor is his faith in this collective authority at all shaken by his being aware that other ages,
countries, sects, churches, classes, and parties have thought, and even now think, the exact
reverse. ... it never troubles him that mere accident has decided which of these numerous
worlds is the object of his reliance, and that the same causes which make him a Churchman
in London, would have made him a Buddhist or a Confucian in [Beijing].”
44See White 2010; see also Korman 2014 on related concerns about perception.
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An irrelevant influence (factor) for me with respect to my belief
that p is one that (a) has influenced my belief that p, and (b) does
not bear on the truth of p.
Thus an important dierence between the tight clustering of beliefs about
the Eiel Tower among Parisians, and the non-beliefs (or even false beliefs)
of others is one we can make sense of given the truth that the Eiel Tower
is in Paris, and so Parisians are mostly likely to know about it. But with
religious diversity, there appears to be little reason to suppose that the socio-
demographic clustering of religious commitments can be easily explained by
which religion might be true; rather, it looks more plausible that we are likely
to adopt the dominant religious perspectives of our upbringing, whether or
not they are true. (Notice that parallel considerations apply to one who
might’ve been raised in a largely secular environment, so this is plausibly
not only a problem for religious adherents.) It’s not just that had you been
raised elsewhere and formed your beliefs in comparable ways (in part by
learning from those around you), you easily might have believed falsely;45 it’s
rather that, without any other guide to what is true of religion, forming one’s
beliefs in these ways looks arbitrary, guided primarily by what dominates
one’s communal context.46
Importantly, however, the mere fact of religious diversity need not require
one to conclude that contingent facts about one’s social and cultural upbring-
ing count as an irrelevant influence. For, in order for such facts to be an irrele-
vant influence, they must not bear on the truth of the matter (Vavova’s clause
(b)). But we will properly judge that such facts of upbringing do not satisfy
(b) only when we have examined carefully what the truth of religion is, or,
having made such investigations, found them inconclusive. So such factors
will only look to be irrelevant to the truth for one who lacks any independent
grounds for thinking that their religious outlook is more correct than the al-
ternatives. If it is possible to study religious worldviews other than one’s own
45If so, then epistemologists would say your belief forming methods are unsafe, and safe
methods are arguably required in order to know (e.g. Sosa 1999; Williamson 2000, 123.).
However, see Bogardus 2013b for the idea that one sometimes could have knowledge even
with unsafe belief (religious belief or otherwise).
46For more on such concerns, see Axtell 2018, and De Cruz 2019, chap. 2.
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and satisfy oneself that the best evidence and arguments support a particular
religious outlook, one may then argue that demographic facts about one’s
upbringing are not playing a large casual role in what one believes. Indeed, it
would be precisely in virtue of such honest study that one would be guided by
an assessment of what seems most true, rather than complacently believing
what is most comfortable given one’s upbringing.47 Similarly for one who,
having investigated the matter, converts to a new religious perspective from
whatever outlook with which one was raised: the mere fact of changing one’s
view after having examined its merits suggests that one has not been merely
swayed by what is familiar and communally accepted.48
2.3 Divine Hiddenness
A dierent sort of argument, due to J.L. Schellenberg (1993, 2015), draws
on (extra-) religious disagreement in order to conclude that there can be no
God, at least of the Christian, perhaps broader monotheist, sort.49 Not all
people seem to have experiences of God, nor are all exposed to comparable
reasoning or testimony about God; but even when they have some of this
evidence, many find the evidence mixed, and thus they do not believe that
there is a God. So there appear to be many who are not culpable in resisting
the evidence, but simply find it inconclusive. So if there is a God, God is
in this sense “hidden” from some. Yet this can seem contrary to what we
would expect if God is loving and wants to be in personal relationship with
everyone. As Schellenberg argues (in its most succinct form):
(1) There are people who are capable of relating personally to God
47Sometimes the irrelevant influences worrier about religious belief seems to assume that
most people whose beliefs largely conform to the worldview with which they were raised
have not subjected their beliefs any honest scrutiny nor explored much of the evidence.
But if we learned instead that a majority of people in a given society have, in fact, critically
evaluated the evidence or arguments over their worldview during their lives (even though the
majority of them continue to hold roughly those same beliefs), it would be unclear whether
the irrelevant influences concern still has much force.
48Note that the pursuit of the truth through such investigation seems crucial here; one
who converts purely to enter into a marriage, for example, still seems subject to the irrelevant
influences objection.
49McGinnis 2015 argues that it would not be an argument against medieval Islamic un-
derstandings of God, which are not personal and relational in the relevant senses.
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but who, through no fault of their own, fail to believe that God
exists. (“non-resistant” non-believers)
(2) If there is a personal God of love, then there are (would be) no
such people.
(3) So: There is no personal God of love.
This argument depends on the existence of disagreement (or at least, non-
agreement) over theism, but only requires there to be some who are “non-
resistant” in their unbelief: Schellenberg’s argument would presumably ex-
tend to a scenario where all religious adherents practiced only one religion,
but where there remained some who sincerely find the evidence or arguments
for it lacking. For Schellenberg then, the possibility of reasonable non-belief
somehow demonstrates the non-existence of (a certain sort of) God.
Much has been written about this style of argument from divine “hid-
dennness.”50 And for many theists, it can be easy to challenge both of its
premises. But at its heart it asks why, if there is a God, would there not be
agreement on that matter? Indeed, more significantly, why would there be
such diverse views about religion and the nature of the supernatural, partic-
ularly if there is a divine being that desires us to know or practice the right
religion?51 Notice, however, in light of the social demographic patterns ad-
verted to in the last section, that we already have at hand some (perhaps
incomplete) sociological explanations of why fairly entrenched patterns of
religious diversity might persist. Additionally, because theistic worldviews
normally have built into them an account of why there is extra-religious dis-
agreement, it is unclear that there is a significant further explanatory burden
for them here.52
2.4 Exclusivism, Inclusivism, Pluralism
Concerns about the epistemological upshots of such diversity often invoke ad-
ditional issues such as how much is at stake for those whose religious views
50For some recent work, see Green and Stump 2015, Anderson 2017, Rea 2018.
51See Marsh and Marsh 2016. See also Nathan King’s contribution to this volume, for
how issues of hiddenness enter into what he calls the “apologist’s dilemma.”
52See, for example, Dumsday 2012a and 2012b, and Baker-Hytch 2016.
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(or lack thereof) are getting things wrong—do matters of salvation or an af-
terlife, or enlightenment, or nirvana, depend on practicing the right religion?
(Or worse, is punishment on oer for those who do not believe or practice
the right religion?) Once these questions are raised, it can seem all the more
important that one believe and practice the true religion.
Normally people assume that, if there is a religious or supernatural reality,
some particular religion is the correct (or most true) one (an assumption
we have made up until now). Thus one’s religious beliefs will be true or
false, and some one religion’s claims will presumably most approximate the
truth, even if it makes some false claims. And if there is one religion whose
tenets are true or mostly true, then the tenets of other, diering religions
are to varying degrees false insofar as their tenets are untrue.53 Of course,
for some religions, believing some of these truths might be crucial to one’s
salvation or end state as redeemed, enlightened, and so on. So it is common
to distinguish between exclusivist religions which only grant redemption to
the believers or practitioners of the one (most) true religion, and inclusivist
religions (or interpretations of them) which insist on there being a single
(most) true religion, but do not insist that only the believers or practioners
of that religion, during their earthly lives, will be redeemed.54
One might ask, however, whether the great range of religious diversity,
both intra-religious and inter-religious, provides support for a dierent meta-
theory of how one’s own religious view relates to the others. John Hick (1989)
contends that such diversity supports a pluralism on which a divine being of
53Note that, even given their distinct tenets, the common commitments of various reli-
gions mean that some of their overlapping claims might be true: for example, if there is
exactly one divine being, who created the universe, the monotheistic religions (such as Ju-
daism, Christianity, and Islam) all agree in this truth. But if Christianity, say, is true, then
Judaism’s and Islam’s denial of many specific Christian claims (such as that Jesus is God
incarnate) would mean that these denials are false.
54Inclusivist positions are prominent in Judaism (the Noahide Laws or Brit Noah extend
salvation to those who follow seven commandments; cf. Gen. 2:16 and 9:4–6). They are also
found in Islam (Qur’an, 2:256; 2:62; 32:7; see also Khalil 2012); and in Christianity (at least
on a straightforward interpretation of Paul’s letter to the Romans, chap. 11; cf. also Matt.
7:21–23, and 25:31–46). The twentieth century Catholic theologian Karl Rahner popularized
an inclusivism with his view (unfortunately named) that there can be “anonymous Christians”
(1976, 283). For more in-depth discussion, see Jonathan Kvanvig’s chapter in this volume,
“How to Be an Inclusivist.”
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some kind is the revelatory source of all religions, but where the revelatory
process necessarily involves cultural reception which influences how dierent
groups adopt and interpret religious claims. Thus we have dierent religious
perspectives such as Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam
(among many others) which are geographically and historical situated such
that the dominant cultural concepts and social priorities end up influencing
how each understands the divine. Thus Hick’s approach can easily explain
the demographic patterns of religious commitment. In addition, he can ap-
peal to the widespread agreement among such religions about morality and
the spiritual life, insisting that in their essentials, they converge on a common
ethic and orientation to a transcendent reality outside ourselves. Looked at
one way, Hick’s line can seem correct: a pluralist picture, where each religious
tradition is accurately (if incompletely) referring to some core features of su-
pernatural reality while also reflecting varying cultural concepts, can appear
to be a better explanation of religious diversity than a particularist exclu-
sivism (or an inclusivism) on which only one religion is the most accurate
account of the supernatural. In this sense then, the sorts of religious diver-
sity we find globally are evidence for pluralism (call this abductive pluralism,
because it oers a best-explanation account of why we find the patterns of re-
ligious diversity). But on the assumption that this pluralist picture is correct,
it raises many further questions. One question is in virtue of what it would be
rational commit to, or to practice, any particular religion. Another question
is why, if pluralism is correct, it is rarely a part of the doctrine of so many
religions. For while many religious traditions are inclusivist or otherwise tol-
erate respectful dissent, almost no major religion embraces the idea that it is
just as true (namely, not very true) as all the other major religions. Thus if
abductive pluralism gains some support from the fact of religious diversity, it
also seems at a loss to explain why so few religions have been tolerant enough
to allow for such a pluralistic diversity.
However, Hick’s articulation of his view is complicated by the places in
which he appears to go anti-realist about religious truth, insisting that reli-
gions’ claims about ultimate reality do not conflict logically, and are neither
true nor false: they are instead merely “mythologically true” such that they
“tend to evoke an appropriate dispositional attitude” for those who endorse
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them (1989, 348); and “what are called conflicting truth-claims... do not in
fact conflict, because they are claims about dierent human awarenesses of
the divine” (2001). But this anti-realist pluralism, in my view, loses any ex-
planatory advantages its abductive cousin might have held, because it is not
in the business of oering a meta-theory on which all such religions are on
a par; nor can it plausibly contend that there is inherent value in any core
agreement over an ethical or spiritual life. Finally, an anti-realist pluralism
has fewer resources to oer a soteriological story on which genuine praction-
ers of all religions (or at least the major ones?) will be redeemed or saved
or be granted a good afterlife; nor can such an anti-realism plausibly claim
that such religions even guarantee redemptive transformation in this life. For
if religions’ varying claims about ultimate reality or how to live are “neither
true nor false,” how can religions make good on promises to redeem us from
our flaws, let alone deliver some sort of salvation or (good) afterlife?
Alvin Plantinga (1995) argues forcefully that the fact of religious diversity,
and the pluralist’s handling of it, need not make a religious exclusivist sus-
pect that their own religious beliefs suer from any irrationality or epistemic
defect, or that maintaining such an exclusivism need involve intellectual arro-
gance or imperialism. Yet Plantinga allows that acknowledging the diversity
of religious perspectives could (though might not) defeat the knowledge which
the believer might otherwise have had in the absence of such acknowledgment
(1995, 214–215), particularly if it leads one to the irrelevant influences worry
that one believes as one does largely due to the religious culture into which
one was born. In this way, knowing more about diversity may lead to less
religious knowledge, at least in the short run. Yet again, much will depend
on the method by which one gained such knowledge (if knowledge it is) in
the first place. If one has in fact gained knowledge of theism, say, by direct ac-
quaintance with the truth of theism (either by apprehending the soundness of
an ontological proof, or by perceptual acquaintance with God), it is entirely
unclear why acknowledging disagreement must undermine that knowledge.55
55Cf. Bogardus 2013a for similar points. Mutatis mutandis if theism is false and it’s possible
to know, by “seeing” directly, that theism is false: acknowledging disagreement from theists
might not dislodge the atheist’s knowledge. For discussion of how secure such knowledge
might be (either the atheist’s or theist’s, depending on which is true), see Benton, Hawthorne,
and Isaacs 2016, esp. §12.
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Notice that exclusivists, as well as some inclusivists, will presumably care
about the considerations favoring Conciliationism in the face of realized re-
ligious disagreement, for they will suppose that it can matter a great deal
that one believe or follow the one (or most) true religion. To that extent
then, following Conciliationist advice might be thought to aid one in (even-
tually) reaching the truth. By contrast, pluralists might be less moved by
Conciliationist motivations, and may well find Steadfast views appealing in-
sofar as they oer some support to the idea that it can be rational to stick
with one’s current religious worldview (if one practices a major religion): for
at least on an abductive pluralism, any inter-religious disagreements we find
between world religions belie the common agreement they have underneath
it all, and so learning of such religious diversity should do little to make one
less confident of one’s own specific religious tradition. (It is far less clear what
an anti-realist pluralist would make of either the Conciliationist or Steadfast
lines of argument; in what follows, I shall mainly have in mind the abductive
pluralist.)
Motivations for (abductive) pluralism can seem structurally analogous to
an argument aimed at cutting through some problems of inter-religious dis-
agreement.56 Common consent arguments,57 in their most modest versions,
appeal to the large number of people who believe that p, and then suggest that
this common consent can at least provide significant evidence for p. While
our focus so far has been on religious disagreement, the common consent
arguer aims to capitalize on the widespread popularity—both currently and
historically—of theism,58 in order to claim that, while not decisive, this fact is
at least some evidence in favor of theism. Whereas the pluralist might argue in
similar ways that the broadly popular and near universal acceptance of some
transcendental religious reality is some reason to think it is real. While treat-
ing common consent as evidence for theism (or religion in its broadest sense)
might seem initially implausible, notice that more generally, broad agreement
56It is unclear whether they provide any solace in the face of extra-religious disagreement,
namely between atheists, agnostics, and religious (theistic or non-theistic).
57See Kelly 2011, Zagzebski 2012, 185., and Matheson forthcoming.
58At least a strong supermajority. Kelly 2011, 146, n. 18 cites one sociologist (whose
avowed goal is to show that non-belief is more prevalent than typically thought) who estimates
that around 88 percent of the global population is theist.
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(even if not unanimous consensus) that p arrived at independently provides
some evidence in favor of p. It does so because the truth of p can figure in
the best explanation of how broad agreement would have been reached, at
least if there are other plausible assumptions about how so many would have
arrived at the belief that p.59 However, where people reach agreement that p
in dependent fashion (such that their reaching the same conclusion is due to
collaboration or external pressure), most will deny that broad agreement is
evidence for p. Note also that disagreement over p, if reached independently,
can (if there are suciently many on each side) provide reason to suspend
judgment: for those who found themselves confident that p (or that not-p),
independently reached disagreement oers higher-order evidence that one
misjudged the initial evidence. But disagreement similarly loses its force if
one learns that such disagreement arose in dependent fashion.60 So common
consent arguers for theism will need to make the case for enough indepen-
dence among those in broad agreement that theism is true.
3 Contributions to this Volume
The contributors to this volume take up a number of the issues raised above
relating religious diversity and disagreement to epistemological issues. In
many cases they also pose fascinating new questions about, and oer intrigu-
ing answers on, how to theorize about religious truth, religious understand-
ing, and decisions over religious or non-religious worldviews.
Laura Frances Callahan, in “Disagreement, Testimony, and Religious Un-
derstanding,” maintains that questions about appropriate responses to reli-
gious disagreement are related to questions about appropriate responses to
religious testimony. Callahan argues that if it is appropriate to alter one’s cre-
dence in a religious proposition on the basis of encountering a disagreeing
59See Kelly 2011 for thoughtful discussion.
60Suppose one learns that ten people believe that p, while ten believe that not-p. But one
also learns that their beliefs were formed by each telling the next, one by one, what they
believe, and they were lined up in such a way that the next listener was always inclined to
distrust and believe the negation of what their informant told them. In such a set-up, the
existence of such a balanced disagreement would not lead one to revise one’s belief, if one
believed that p (or if one believed that not-p).
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peer, it is also appropriate to alter one’s credence in a religious proposition
on the basis of encountering a testifier who is at least as competent and in-
formed as oneself, when one is antecedently unopinionated on the matter at
hand. However, recent literature on moral testimony should give us pause, in
assuming that it is generally appropriate to alter one’s credences in religious
propositions purely on the basis of encountering putatively trustworthy testi-
fiers. Callahan suggests that, in many religious cases as in many moral cases,
there is distinctive value or importance in acquiring not merely knowledge
but understanding. The distinctive importance of understanding in the reli-
gious and moral domains generates a reason not to engage in doxastic prac-
tices that threaten or disincentivize understanding in these domains—such
as changing one’s doxastic attitudes purely on the authority of another’s tes-
timony. She claims that it is often inappropriate to adjust one’s credence in a
religious proposition purely on the basis of encountering a testifier, no mat-
ter how competent and well-informed. This suggests that it may often also be
inappropriate to adjust one’s credence on the basis of religious disagreement,
for the reason that in so doing one would threaten or disincentivize religious
understanding.
Sanford Goldberg, in “How Confident Should the Religious Believer be in
the Face of Religious Pluralism?”, defends various arguments from religious
diversity or disagreement which purport to support skepticism regarding jus-
tified (or rational) religious belief. Goldberg explores the prospects for re-
sisting these sorts of argument. He notes that those who would resist can (i)
downgrade her disagreeing interlocutor(s), (ii) appeal to epistemic permis-
sivism, (iii) argue that the believer is no worse o, epistemically speaking,
than the atheist or agnostic non-believer, or (iv) argue that the principles
that convict the faithful of irrationality overreach, and would establish a more
widespread skepticism about rational belief. After presenting what Goldberg
regards as the best version of the argument from diversity or disagreement,
he then argues that any believer who hopes for truth will not get much solace
from any of these responses.
Margaret Greta Turnbull, in “Religious Disagreement is Not Unique,” ar-
gues against a common approach taken by some epistemologists, who insist
that religious disagreement is distinctive from other sorts of disagreements,
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and that this distinction changes whether religious disagreements demand
a conciliatory response. More specifically, these epistemologists have argued
that religious disagreement has special features which make it possible for the-
ists to resist conciliatory arguments according to which they must adjust their
religious beliefs in response to finding that peers disagree with them. Turn-
bull considers the three most prominent features which are claimed to make
religious disagreement distinct: religious evidence, evaluative standards in
religious contexts, and religious transformative experience. She argues that
these three features fail to distinguish religious disagreement in the ways that
others have thought. However, she also shows that the view that religious
disagreement is not a unique form of disagreement makes religious disagree-
ment less, rather than more, worrisome to the theist who would prefer to
rationally remain steadfast in her religious beliefs.
In a similar spirit, Richard Feldman argues in “What’s Special about Re-
ligious Disagreement?” that there is nothing special about disagreement as
compared with other cases of mixed evidence, and further, that there are no
principles governing religious disagreements that dier from those governing
other disagreements. Rather, in all such scenarios and for all domains, includ-
ing religious matters, one should endeavor to follow the evidence. Feldman
thinks that what is typical about such contexts is that they typically provide
circumstances wherein one should be conciliatory toward those who disagree
by reducing one’s confidence, because learning about others who disagree
tends to shift the weight of one’s evidence, even if only slightly, away from
what one already believes. Yet he examines how complicated it might be to
discern such evidential pressure, particularly when it bears on one’s funda-
mental or “core” religious beliefs. Along the way he considers how religious
experiences, along with the recognition that others have not had such expe-
riences, may figure in what sorts of evidence one has with respect to religious
matters.
Nathan King, in “The Apologist’s Dilemma,” considers the position of
the theistic apologist. Such a person seeks to provide rational arguments
for her belief that God exists. In today’s intellectual milieu, she must do so
with a keen awareness of religious diversity and disagreement. However, in
an intellectual setting that calls for epistemic humility, the apologist faces a
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dilemma concerning the rational force she takes her arguments to have. This
dilemma concerns the Uniqueness Thesis—roughly, the idea that for a given
body of evidence, E, precisely one doxastic attitude toward E is epistemically
rational. Should the apologist embrace Uniqueness or not? There appear to
be pitfalls either way. If the apologist embraces Uniqueness, then she seems
committed to the claim that those who reject her arguments are irrational—a
result that can seem arrogant and overbearing. This might seem to suggest
that the apologist should deny Uniqueness and instead embrace the idea that
rationality is permissive: for some bodies of evidence, E, more than one dox-
astic response to E can be rational. However King points out that adopting
this position appears to come at a cost: it seems to commit the apologist to
the claim that even in the face of her apologetic arguments, someone might
be rational in not embracing theism. That is, despite her arguments, rational
non-belief occurs. Inasmuch as the latter claim is a key premise in atheistic
arguments from divine hiddenness, denying the Uniqueness Thesis seems to
raise the specter of atheism. In sum, this is the Apologist’s Dilemma: ei-
ther embrace Uniqueness at the cost of losing humble apologetics, or deny
Uniqueness at the cost of skirting atheism. King aims to further articulate
this Dilemma and explore possible responses to it.
Joshua Blanchard and L.A. Paul, in “Transformative Experience and the
Problem of Religious Disagreement,” take up the issue of how religious diver-
sity aects the decision over whether to adopt a particular religious world-
view, given that such a conversion can transform who one becomes. Religious
pluralism presents religious believers, agnostics, and skeptics alike with an
epistemological problem: how can confidence in any religious claims (includ-
ing their negations) be epistemically justified? There seem to be rational,
well-informed adherents among a variety of mutually incompatible religious
and non-religious perspectives, and so the problem of peer disagreement in-
evitably arises in the religious domain. Blanchard and Paul show that the
transformative nature of religious experience and identity poses more than
just this traditional, epistemic problem of religious belief. In encountering
one another, believers, agnostics, and skeptics confront not just dierent be-
liefs, but dierent ways of being a person. To transition between religious belief
and skepticism is not just to adopt a dierent set of beliefs, but to transform
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into a dierent version of oneself. They argue that the transformative nature
of religious identity intensifies the problem of pluralism by adding a new di-
mension to religious disagreement, for there are principled reasons to think
we can lack epistemic and aective access to potential religious, agnostic,
or skeptical selves. In addition, Blanchard and Paul reflect on the relation-
ship between the transformative problem of religious pluralism and the more
traditional question about which religious beliefs are true.
Jonathan Kvanvig, in “How to Be an Inclusivist,” examines in detail a
meta-theory of the relationship between religious truth and salvation or re-
demption. Inclusivism is designed to be a middle position between Exclu-
sivism and Pluralism, but current formulations suer from limitations. First,
Karl Rahner’s own version of the view is put in Christian terms, but if the
view is supposed to be metatheoretic, it needs a formulation that is neutral
as to the truth of any particular religion. Second, attempts to generate such
neutrality run into the diculty of being unable delineate exactly what distin-
guishes this middle position from fully relativistic Pluralism. The solution to
both problems, Kvanvig argues, is to adopt a broader understanding of faith,
one that is not centrally cognitive, one which explains why faith is a generic
virtue in any context, and one which gives a way of distinguishing Inclusivism
from its alternatives. The key element of Kvanvig’s proposal is that, if faith
is not centrally cognitive, there is nothing about this attitude that makes an
appeal to it a partisan one with respect to the universe of faiths. That result
allows a religion-neutral metatheoretic stance that can nonetheless avoid Plu-
ralism by allowing the redemptive value of a religion to be located in the one
true religion, as Rahner maintained, but without implying that the story of
salvation appeals to cognitive attitudes constitutive of saving faith.
John Pittard, in “Rationalist Resistance to Disagreement-Motivated Reli-
gious Skepticism,” considers the question: when is it reasonable to maintain
confident religious (or irreligious) belief in the face of systematic religious dis-
agreement? Pittard argues that the answer to this question depends in large
measure on the scope of what may be called partisan justication: roughly, a
subject has partisan justification for her belief that p when she is reasonable in
having a degree of confidence for p that exceeds an impartial estimate of her
cognitive reliability on the matter. He considers a number of dierent views
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on the nature and scope of partisan justification, and defends a rationalist
account according to which partisan justification is grounded in rational in-
sight and is not available in disagreements with acknowledged rational parity.
Pittard then explores some implications of this rationalist account for reli-
gious belief. One such implication is that “reformed epistemology,”61 which
deemphasizes the role that rational insight and rational assessment play in the
formation and justification of religious belief, does not have the resources to
adequately defend religious belief in the face of skeptical worries raised by
religious disagreement.
In “The Disagreement Argument without Uniqueness,” Thomas Senor
evaluates whether the normative force of disagreement depends on the
Uniqueness thesis. Recall that the Uniqueness thesis says, roughly, that a
given set of evidence supports a unique doxastic or creedal attitude for any
given proposition. This thesis has played a large role in arguments that, in
cases of disagreement among peers who share an evidence set, at most one of
the peers is rational. Senor oers some reasons for thinking that Uniqueness
is unable to play the role it has frequently been assigned in the disagreement
literature. Senor primarily focuses on the extent to which concilationist ar-
guments in the disagreement debate can be recast if Uniqueness is rejected.
But he goes on to argue that disagreement remains a problem even without
the uniqueness assumption.
Katherine Dormandy, in “Religious Disagreement: Epistemically Good
and Good for Faith,” extends an argument62 that religious disagreement can
actually be epistemically beneficial, but also conducive to a flourishing faith.
She does this by examining two important objections to the idea that such
disagreements can be epistemically beneficial. The first objection is that reli-
gious beliefs are emotive: even contemplating the idea that we may be wrong
about them can strengthen defensive biases, making it even harder to be
open-minded to insights from disagreeing interlocutors; thus it concludes that
religious disagreement is in fact epistemically counterproductive. Dormandy
clarifies, however, that religious disagreement is epistemically beneficial when
61See especially Plantinga 2000, Alston 1991, and Wolterstor 2010 (esp. Chaps. 8, 11,
and 12). For an overview, see McNabb 2019.
62Developed in Dormandy 2018a, 2018b, forthcoming.
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conducted respectfully. Mutual respect between disagreeing interlocutors helps
defuse defensive biases. But even if religious disagreement is epistemically
beneficial, it is surely detrimental to religious faith (so the second objection).
After all, disagreement subjects your view to challenging counterevidence,
whereas faith is commonly taken to involve restricting your intake of evi-
dence so as to avoid challenge. Dormandy argues, however, that engaging in
(respectful) disagreement can produce knowledge that enhances rather than
destroys a relationship of faith. The key is in seeing that engaging in dis-
agreement need not be construed as “checking up,” on the object of your
faith, but rather as showing her the respect of caring to know better what she
is like and thus of relating to her honestly. Religious disagreement can thus
be epistemically beneficial, as well as conducive to a flourishing faith; and
respect—for your interlocutor and for the object of your faith—plays a key
role in seeing this.
Finally Isaac Choi, in “Democracy of the Dead? The Relevance of
Majority Opinion in Theology,” explores how to think about indicators of
expertise and discernment of the truth in theological doctrines. Should we
prefer the majority opinion in theology, whether it be the majority opinion
over the history of the church (as in G. K. Chesterton’s “democracy of the
dead”) or the majority opinion of contemporary theologians? Choi argues
that because of the vast dierences in accessible evidence between past and
present-day theologians, diachronic majority opinion is problematic. In the
synchronic case, ignorance of minority arguments, biases, selection eects,
and the diculty to deciding who gets to vote present many opportunities for
majorities to be wrong. Finally, Choi considers whether a Christian doctrine
of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit can rescue the democracy of the
dead, but he concludes that given the gentle way God might correct people,
diachronic majority opinion, apart from belief in a very basic set of truths,
is not epistemically bolstered by the Spirit.63
Seattle Pacic University
63Many thanks to Jonathan Kvanvig, John Pittard, Patrick McDonald, Rebekah Rice, and
Leland Saunders for helpful feedback on this chapter.
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